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Serge-Christophe Kolm has published on pro-social preferences, altruism and reci-
procity since 1975, long before such ideas were taken seriously in economics. Kolm
was invited to deliver the Federico Caffè lectures in 2003 and took this occasion to
gather his work of more than three decades on reciprocity into an comprehensive book.
The book presents a very thorough classification of forms of reciprocal behavior.
The three basic forms are “balance reciprocity” (also called comparative or matching
reciprocity), “liking reciprocity”, and “continuation reciprocity”. Consider an agent
who receives a gift from another agent. In balance reciprocity the received gift pro-
duces an imbalance for the receiver. The receiver then feels an obligation to return a
gift of similar value in order to restore the balance. The motive for doing this could
be a desire to avoid feelings of shame or guilt. Balance reciprocity relies on concepts
such as duty, propriety, and norm following. In liking reciprocity the central motive for
returning a gift is the agent’s feelings towards the giver. If an agent cares for another
agent then he has a desire to treat her kindly. Two subtypes of liking reciprocity are
“gift-induced liking”, where the initial gift is the reason for the liking and eventu-
ally the return gift. In the second subtype, “reciprocal liking”, the positive emotions
towards other agents are not due to gifts, but due to the fact that agents like people who
like themselves. Liking reciprocity refers to a kind of conditional altruism, in which
generosity depends on the feelings towards the other agent. The third form, contin-
uation reciprocity, is gift giving due to self interested motives. The agent engages in
gift giving simply because the expected return gift makes it worthwhile, which is,
according to the author, barely worth the label “reciprocity”.
Kolm also studies the scope of reciprocal relationships. The basic case is when
agent A’s being kind to agent B induces B to return the favor. In extended reciprocities
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A’s kindness to B can elicit B’s kindness to C. This is called “generalized reciprocity”
and occurs when agents feel a responsibility to return a favor not to a specific indi-
vidual but to a group of individuals. For example, when B received help from A in a
difficult situation she might be more likely to help other agents in the same situation.
On the other hand, if A’s kindness to B elicits C’s kindness to A then Kolm speaks
of “reverse reciprocity”. Reverse reciprocity occurs for example in liking reciprocity,
when the fact that A treats B favorably induces C to like A and thus induces gift
giving.
Unlike other scholars Kolm argues that there is a fundamental difference between
positive and negative reciprocity. He argues that negative reciprocity only occurs in the
case of continuation reciprocity and balance reciprocity. In continuation reciprocity
agents exchange favors for purely selfish reasons and they need the constant threat of
not returning the favor to uphold the gift equilibrium. In balance reciprocity agents
suffer from the imbalance produced by hostile acts of other agents. The desire to
restore balance can then evoke retaliatory acts. For the third type of reciprocity, liking
reciprocity, Kolm claims that there is no negative counterpart. According to his view
agents have a desire to benefit people they like but they do not wish to harm people
they dislike.
Later in the book Kolm puts reciprocity into a broader perspective and discusses
the role of reciprocity as one of four modes of economic transfers, the other three
being coercion (forced, e.g. by the state), market exchange, and pure gift-giving. He
also stresses the role of reciprocity in correcting market failures such as the free-rider
problem in public goods situations, and explores the origins of reciprocal preferences
from an evolutionary perspective. In the final part of the book, Kolm develops a for-
mal model of reciprocity. He proposes a concept of a reciprocity game with a utility
function that incorporates elements of balance and liking reciprocity as well as pref-
erences over processes. In the last chapter Kolm relates his theory to other approaches
in sociology, anthropology, social psychology, and economics.
The book presents an interesting and broad collection of motives for reciprocal
acts and modes of reciprocity, which is stimulating for researchers active in this field.
The value of Kolm’s theoretical approach to reciprocity is, however, unclear to me.
The theory seems to be able to catch everything, which immediately poses the question
of its usefulness for practical applications. Kolm does not offer testable predictions
and, unlike other scholars in the field, does not apply his theory to specific games. Fur-
thermore, the book largely ignores the vast development of both theoretical approaches
as well as empirical results in behavioral economics over the last two decades (see
e.g. Camerer 2003; Sobel 2005). Part of this literature is cited in the final chapter
but Kolm does not really compare his approach to other theories of social prefer-
ences nor does he care to draw from stylized facts of the experimental literature on
social preferences. Thus, systematic empirical evidence is used neither for inspir-
ing the model nor for testing the predictions. To conclude, the book covers a large
number of interesting aspects of reciprocal behaviors. For the most part it is writ-
ten in a non-technical, comprehensible, albeit quite repetitive, style. The applica-
tion and predictions of the theory outlined in the book to specific situations remain
unclear and so does its relation to the existing body of literature on social prefer-
ences.
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